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USIB-D-39.7/22
7 August 1967

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT : Committee on Documentation Report of
Task Team VII (Analyst Communication)

REFERENCES: a. USIB-D-39.7/6, 6 May 1964
b. USIB-M-322, 29 April 1964, item 5
c. USIB-D-39.7/5, 16 March 1964

1. The enclosed report by the Committee on Documentation (CODIB) on the study undertaken by CODIB's Task Team VII (Analyst Communication), which responds to USIB directives in reference a., is submitted for USIB consideration of the Recommendations contained in Section D, page 5. This report is the sixth response to the USIB action at its meeting on 29 April 1964 (reference b.) approving as amended the CODIB recommendations on pages 20, 21 and 22 of the Stage I Report of the Staff for the Community Information Processing Study (SCIPS) (reference c.).

2. Specifically the enclosed CODIB report and the attached Task Team VII report are a response to Recommendation 4.h. of the final USIB-approved recommendations regarding the SCIPS Report which directed CODIB to develop "proposals for improved analyst-to-analyst communication, including the feasibility of a centralized Intelligence Community directory service". In addition to the Recommendations the enclosed CODIB report contains a Background Statement, a Summary of Task Team Findings and CODIB Comments on the Task Team Report.

USIB Action Requested

3. Board members are requested to indicate their concurrence in or other views on the Recommendations in Section D, page 5 of the attached CODIB Report by completing and returning the vote sheet appended hereto by close of business 17 August 1967.

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Enclosure

Executive Secretary

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CODIB-D-111/1.7/8
3 August 1967

U N I T E D S T A T E S I N T E L L I G E N C E B O A R D
COMMITTEE ON DOCUMENTATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: United States Intelligence Board

SUBJECT: Report of CODIB Task Team VII - Analyst Communication

REFERENCES: a. USIB-D-39.7/6, 6 May 1964
b. CODIB-D-111/1.7/5, 7 April 1967 (Attached)

A. Background.

This is a report on the study undertaken by CODIB's Task Team VII, Analyst Communication, pursuant to USIB direction contained in Reference a. The task team was chaired by a representative of the Department of State with additional members from DIA and CIA. The objectives of the task team were to: (a) study present practices and procedures in the field of intelligence analyst-to-analyst communications to ascertain whether improvement is required; and, if required, to develop proposals to facilitate the exchange between analysts of substantive information and personal judgment and expertise, and (b) to determine the feasibility of establishing a centralized intelligence community directory service as an aid in any program of improvement. The study was confined to those components of USIB agencies in the Washington, D.C., area which produce current, basic or estimative finished intelligence. For practical reasons the team concentrated its study on one geographic area (viz., Latin America); however, the problems were discussed with a number of analysts in other geographic and functional areas. The team felt that the coverage was sufficiently broad to validate the views set forth in its report.

B. Summary of Task Team Findings.

The task team found that while the situation with respect to analyst-to-analyst communication was generally more satisfactory than

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had been presumed when the team was organized, there remains room for improvement. Analysts in one agency communicate with analysts in another agency for two major purposes: (a) to exchange views and judgments and (b) to obtain information. Such communication is not generally undertaken to avoid duplication of effort. Although present facilities and procedures enable an analyst in one agency to identify and make contact with analysts in another agency, there are many inadequacies, and the cumulative effect of these is a definite impediment to useful analyst-to-analyst communication. The only communication system fully accessible to all analysts is the black, insecure telephone. While it should not be used for classified discussions or to transmit classified information, the task team reported that it is widely and extensively used to discuss classified matters.*

The NSA secure telephone (gray phone) system is available only to analysts with special clearance, which many in DIA and State do not have. The instruments are located only in restricted areas, in many cases remote from a large number of analysts who do have the proper clearance. Furthermore, the gray phone system should be used only to discuss SIGINT materials. Expansion of this system would be both expensive and difficult and is not planned at present. Teletype and LDX (Long Distance Xerography) are available to a limited extent but use of these mechanisms is time-consuming and cumbersome, and the analysts must leave their desks and files in order to use them. Just at the time a particular analyst needs to communicate with another the equipment may be engaged in priority communications. Furthermore, DIA is not yet in the LDX network.

The KY-3 (green) phone system, in use now and being expanded for secure voice communication between key offices in the Washington area (i.e., White House, State, DoD and CIA), offers considerable promise for alleviating the present deficiency in facilities for analyst-to-analyst secure communication. The KY-3 system will connect at the Pentagon with the worldwide Automatic Secure Voice Communications system (AUTOSEVOCOM) which also uses KY-3 terminals in the Washington area. Out-of-town offices on the AUTOSEVOCOM net will generally use a narrow band HY-2 terminal, but clusters of out-of-town subscribers may also use KY-3's to converse with each other because of better voice quality on KY-3's. There are now about 100 KY-3 terminals in CIA, 30 in State,

*The Army has no basis for supporting this statement in that the Army did not participate as a member of Task Team VII and Army analysts were not queried concerning use of insecure phones for discussion of classified matters.

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and about 220 in or planned for DoD Washington offices. Others are planned for CIA and State. DIA has two KY-3 terminals at present. Others are planned for installation in 1967 in both Arlington Hall and the Pentagon. Seven additional secure telephone outlets can be attached to a KY-3 terminal at a cost of about \$1800 per terminal. The lines can be extended up to 1,000 feet from the terminal provided they are given adequate security protection. These additional "green" phones, if located in the analysts' working areas, would greatly improve the present analyst-to-analyst communication capabilities. The task team recommends that this be done in the Washington area wherever feasible.

The task team found no enthusiasm by analysts for a centralized directory service and concluded that it could not be justified because of the security problems involved, the cost and the difficulty of establishing and maintaining such a service. In lieu thereof, the team felt that increased access to listings of key personnel, organizational charts, and telephone directories of the various agencies would aid significantly in identifying and locating the appropriate analyst in another agency.

The task team believes that the use of closed circuit television techniques could be developed into a useful means of analyst-to-analyst communication especially between photo interpreters and general analysts. The feasibility of these techniques has been demonstrated. However, application to real-life situations requires further effort which the task team recommends be undertaken.

The task team reports that there may be unprecedented progress in the field of secure communications in the next few years. Therefore, it believes that continuous liaison is necessary between managers of major analysis activities and those responsible for planning and developing secure voice systems in order to take full advantage of new developments in terms of improved analyst-to-analyst communication capabilities.

C. CODIB Comment.

In view of the fact that the intelligence community is now housed in over forty buildings in the Washington area, we believe that there is much to be gained by improving, through concerted community effort, the mechanisms by which analysts in one agency or building can make contact with analysts in another agency or building and discuss classified matters. The temptation is very great to use the insecure

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telephone, which is on virtually every analyst's desk, for discussion of classified matters, especially when the only alternative is a time-consuming personal visit to discuss a matter that would require only a short telephone conversation. We believe that the secure voice and other communications media available to analysts are far from satisfactory. We agree with the task team that the "green" phone system offers good prospects for immediate improvement.

We have learned recently that a small, portable, relatively low-cost device (Magnafax 840 Facsimile Transceiver) is now available commercially and can be used in conjunction with a telephone to transmit either text or graphic materials at any security level for which the telephone is approved. We believe that use of devices of this type warrants consideration.

We agree with the task team, but not necessarily for the same reasons, that a directory service to assist in identifying and contacting analysts is not warranted at this time. We feel that we should not place any greater temptation before the analysts than they now have to use the insecure phone system for classified conversations. We view with some alarm the situation reported by the task team that the insecure phone system is used widely and extensively to discuss classified matters. Steps should be taken immediately to remedy the condition which makes this practice a virtual necessity. We believe that the problem of a directory service should be examined again after there has been an improvement in the facilities for secure voice communication between analysts in different buildings. In the meantime, the existing liaison staffs should be permitted to secure and have available such telephone directories, organizational charts, listings of key personnel and handbooks from the other agencies as are needed to assist those analysts whom they serve in identifying and locating the appropriate analysts and sources of information in the other agencies. In this regard we note that CIA no longer maintains a liaison officer at Arlington Hall where the bulk of DIA analysts are located.

We believe that there is considerable advantage to be gained from application of closed circuit television techniques to the analysis and communication of intelligence. However, we cannot foresee all of the gains with sufficient clarity at this time to warrant recommending priority effort.

We have learned since the task team completed its report that the Army Electronics Command, as executive agent for the Defense Communications Agency, has had an extensive and successful program underway to

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develop equipment and techniques for secure transmission of video signals over lines used for commercial TV. The prototype equipment and techniques have been developed and tested and are operationally satisfactory. The cost at the present time is rather high, on the order of \$1 million per pair of terminals. We have asked the Army Electronics Command and the Defense Communications Agency to keep us informed of further developments and/or plans for installation of any secure video systems. We will examine these to see whether they might be used or extended into appropriate areas to enhance analyst-to-analyst communications.

D. Recommendations.

We recommend that USIB:


1. Request its member agencies participating in the KY-3 (green) secure voice communications system in the Washington area to examine the locations of existing and planned KY-3 terminals and, wherever warranted and feasible, add a call box and extend the additional telephone lines thus provided into appropriate areas so as to improve analyst-to-analyst communications capabilities between buildings and agencies, and that they give this matter priority attention so as to alleviate as soon as possible the current situation in which the commercial telephone system is the only one available to a large percentage of the analysts.

2. Request the member agencies to assure continuing participation by managers of the major analysis organizations in the planning activities of those people concerned with the development and installation of secure voice communications equipment and systems so that analyst-to-analyst communication capabilities may be improved in the future to the maximum feasible extent.

3. Endorse the principle that the liaison staffs of the various agencies should be permitted to obtain and have available such telephone directories, organizational charts, listings of key personnel and handbooks as are needed to assist those analysts whom they serve in identifying appropriate analysts and sources of information in the other agencies.

4. Note the attached report of CODIB Task Team VII.

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Chairman

Attachment:
CODIB-D-111/1.7/5

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